Document NO_PROXY and set_proxy_from_env in cookbook c16-proxy

Replaces the now-incorrect Note at the bottom of c16-proxy ("cpp-httplib
does not read HTTP_PROXY...") with the actual API.

JA is the master per the project's translation workflow; the EN
translation lands in the same PR. Both pages remain `status: "draft"`
for normal review.

Adds two sections:

  - Bypass the proxy for specific hosts (set_no_proxy):
    pattern syntax, dot-boundary rule, case-insensitivity, IP
    normalization via inet_pton, port-specific-entries unsupported,
    malformed entries dropped.

  - Read proxy settings from the environment (set_proxy_from_env):
    which variables are read, lowercase-only http_proxy with an
    inline httpoxy / CVE-2016-5385 explanation, threading caveat.
This commit is contained in:
yhirose
2026-05-08 23:23:14 +09:00
parent da2621ed9f
commit 26569b42fa
2 changed files with 80 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@@ -49,4 +49,43 @@ cli.set_bearer_token_auth("api-token"); // for the end server
`Proxy-Authorization` is sent to the proxy, `Authorization` to the end server.
> **Note:** cpp-httplib does not read `HTTP_PROXY` or `HTTPS_PROXY` environment variables automatically. If you want to honor them, read them in your application and pass the values to `set_proxy()`.
## Bypass the proxy for specific hosts
You often want internal endpoints to skip the proxy. Configure a bypass list with `set_no_proxy()`.
```cpp
cli.set_proxy("proxy.internal", 8080);
cli.set_no_proxy({"internal.corp", "10.0.0.0/8", "*.dev.local"});
```
Each entry is one of:
- `*` — bypass the proxy for all hosts
- a hostname suffix (e.g. `example.com`) — matches `example.com` itself and any subdomain (`foo.example.com`). A leading dot is permitted but informational; both forms are equivalent.
- a single IP literal (e.g. `192.168.1.1`, `::1`)
- a CIDR block (e.g. `10.0.0.0/8`, `fe80::/10`)
Hostname matching is case-insensitive and uses a dot-boundary rule, so an entry of `example.com` does **not** match `evilexample.com`. IP comparisons are normalized through `inet_pton`, so `127.0.0.1` cannot be bypassed via alternate string forms (e.g. `127.000.000.001`). When an entry matches, the `Proxy-Authorization` header is suppressed as well.
Malformed entries are silently dropped. Port-specific entries such as `example.com:8080` are not supported (cpp-httplib's other host-keyed APIs are also keyed on hostname only).
## Read proxy settings from the environment
Call `set_proxy_from_env()` at startup to pick up proxy configuration from environment variables.
```cpp
httplib::Client cli("https://api.example.com");
cli.set_proxy_from_env();
```
Variables read:
- `https_proxy` / `HTTPS_PROXY` — used by HTTPS clients
- `http_proxy` (**lowercase only**, see below) — used by HTTP clients
- `no_proxy` / `NO_PROXY` — comma-separated bypass list
Returns `true` if at least one variable was found and applied.
> **Security Note:** The uppercase `HTTP_PROXY` is intentionally **not** read. In CGI/FastCGI environments, the `HTTP_*` namespace is used to expose HTTP request headers, which lets a remote attacker inject an arbitrary proxy URL via the `Proxy:` request header ([CVE-2016-5385 / "httpoxy"](https://httpoxy.org/)). cpp-httplib follows curl, Go, and Python `requests` in honoring only the lowercase `http_proxy`. `HTTPS_PROXY` and `NO_PROXY` are safe in either case because their names do not begin with `HTTP_`.
> **Note:** `set_proxy_from_env()` reads `getenv` synchronously; call it once at startup. Concurrent `setenv` from other threads while this function runs is undefined.