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cpp-httplib/test/fuzzing/corpus/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-client_fuzzer-5188033728282624
yhirose 2d2efe46da Fix OSS-Fuzz #508342856: cap Content-Length reservation by payload_max_length_
A malicious or malformed server response with an enormous Content-Length
header (e.g. 20000000000) caused the client to call res.body.reserve(len)
with the untrusted value, triggering OOM before read_content's
payload_max_length_ check could take effect. Cap the pre-reservation
at payload_max_length_, since reading more than that is never useful.
2026-05-01 21:28:57 +09:00

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HTTP/1.1 777
Content-Length:20000000000